'Since then you have seen the form both of the imperfect and the perfect good, I think I should now shew you where lies this perfection of happiness.In this I think our first inquiry must be whether any good of this kind can exist in the very nature of a subject; for we must not let any vain form of thought make us miss the truth of this matter.But there can be no denial of its existence, that it is as the very source of all good.For if anything is said to be imperfect, it is held to be so by some loss of its perfection.Wherefore if in any kind of thing a particular seems imperfect, there must also be a perfect specimen in the same kind.For if you take away the perfection, Page 82it is impossible even to imagine whence could come the so-called imperfect specimen.For nature does not start from degenerate or imperfect specimens, but starting from the perfect and ideal, it degenerates to these lower and weaker forms.If then, as we have shewn above, there is an uncertain and imperfect happiness to be found in the good, then there must doubtless be also a sure and perfect happiness therein.' 1'Yes,' said I,' that is quite surely proved to be true.'
'Now consider,' she continued,' where it lies.The universally accepted notion of men proves that God, the fountain-head of all things, is good.For nothing can be thought of better than God, and surely He, than whom there is nothing better, must without doubt be good.Now reason shews us that God is so good, that we are convinced that in Him lies also the perfect good.For if it is not so, He cannot be the fountain-head;for there must then be something more excellent, possessing that perfect good, which appears to be of older origin than God: for it has been proved that all perfections are of earlier origin than the imperfect specimens of the same: wherefore, unless we are to prolong the series to infinity, we must allow that the highest Deity must be full of the highest, the perfect good.But as we have laid down that true happiness is perfect 82:1 -- This reasoning hangs upon Plato's theory of ideas and so is the opposite of the theory of evolution.Page 83good, it must be that true happiness is situated in His Divinity.'
'Yes, I accept that; it cannot be in any way contradicted.'
'But,' she said,' I beg you, be sure that you accept with a sure conscience and determination this fact, that we have said that the highest Deity is filled with the highest good.'
'How should I think of it? ' I asked.
'You must not think of God, the Father of all, whom we hold to be filled with the highest good, as having received this good into Himself from without, nor that He has it by nature in such a manner that you might consider Him, its possessor, and the happiness possessed, as having different essential existences.For if you think that good has been received from without, that which gave it must be more excellent than that which received it; but we have most rightly stated that He is the most excellent of all things.And if you think that it is in Him by His nature, but different in kind, then, while we speak of God as the fountain-head of all things, who could imagine by whom these different kinds can have been united? Lastly, that which is different from anything cannot be the thing from which it differs.So anything which is by its nature different from the highest good, cannot be the highest good.And this we must not think of God, than whom there is nothing more excellent, as we have agreed.
Nothing in this world can have a nature which is better than Page 84its origin, wherefore I would conclude that that which is the origin of all things, according to the truest reasoning, is by its essence the highest good.'
'Most truly,' I said.
'You agree that the highest good is happiness? '
'Yes.'
'Then you must allow that God is absolute happiness?
'I cannot deny what you put forward before, and I see that this follows necessarily from those propositions.'
'Look then,' she said,' whether it is proved more strongly by this too: there cannot be two highest goods which are different.For where two good things are different, the one cannot be the other; wherefore neither can be the perfect good, while each is lacking to the other.And that which is not perfect cannot be the highest, plainly.Therefore if two things are highest good, they cannot be different.Further, we have proved to ourselves that both happiness and God are each the highest good.
Therefore the highest Deity must be identical with the highest happiness.'
'No conclusion,' I said,' could be truer in fact, or more surely proved by reason, or more worthy of our God.'
'Besides this let me give you corollary, as geometricians do, when they wish to add a point drawn from the propositions they have proved.Since men become happy by Page 85acquiring happiness, and happiness is identical with divinity, it is plain that they become happy by acquiring divinity.But just as men become just by acquiring the quality of justice, and wise by wisdom, so by the same reasoning, by acquiring divinity they become divine.Every happy man then is divine.But while nothing prevents as many men as possible from being divine, God is so by His nature, men become so by participation.'
'This corollary,' I said,' or whatever you call it, is indeed beautiful and very precious.'
'Yes, but nothing can be more beautiful than this too which reason would have us add to what we have agreed upon.'
'What is that? ' I asked.
'Happiness seems to include many things: do all these join it together as into a whole which is happiness, as though each thing were a different part thereof, or is any one of them a good which fulfils the essence of happiness, and do the others merely bear relations to this one.? '
'I would have you make this plain by the enunciation of these particulars.'
'Do we not,' she asked,' hold that happiness is a good thing? '
'Yes,' I answered,' the highest good.'
'But you may apply this quality of happiness to them all.
