To avoid the misfortunes, which might have involved you and your money accounts in perplexity and suspicion, you prudently waited the arrival of a plan of operations from England, which was that you should proceed for Philadelphia by way of the Chesapeake, and that Burgoyne, after reducing Ticonderoga, should take his route by Albany, and, if necessary, join you.
The splendid laurels of the last campaign have flourished in the north.In that quarter America has surprised the world, and laid the foundation of this year's glory.The conquest of Ticonderoga, (if it may be called a conquest) has, like all your other victories, led on to ruin.Even the provisions taken in that fortress (which by General Burgoyne's return was sufficient in bread and flour for nearly 5000 men for ten weeks, and in beef and pork for the same number of men for one month) served only to hasten his overthrow, by enabling him to proceed to Saratoga, the place of his destruction.A short review of the operations of the last campaign will show the condition of affairs on both sides.
You have taken Ticonderoga and marched into Philadelphia.These are all the events which the year has produced on your part.Atrifling campaign indeed, compared with the expenses of England and the conquest of the continent.On the other side, a considerable part of your northern force has been routed by the New York militia under General Herkemer.Fort Stanwix has bravely survived a compound attack of soldiers and savages, and the besiegers have fled.The Battle of Bennington has put a thousand prisoners into our hands, with all their arms, stores, artillery and baggage.General Burgoyne, in two engagements, has been defeated; himself, his army, and all that were his and theirs are now ours.Ticonderoga and Independence [forts]
are retaken, and not the shadow of an enemy remains in all the northern districts.At this instant we have upwards of eleven thousand prisoners, between sixty and seventy [captured] pieces of brass ordnance, besides small arms, tents, stores, etc.
In order to know the real value of those advantages, we must reverse the scene, and suppose General Gates and the force he commanded to be at your mercy as prisoners, and General Burgoyne, with his army of soldiers and savages, to be already joined to you in Pennsylvania.So dismal a picture can scarcely be looked at.It has all the tracings and colorings of horror and despair; and excites the most swelling emotions of gratitude by exhibiting the miseries we are so graciously preserved from.
I admire the distribution of laurels around the continent.It is the earnest of future union.South Carolina has had her day of sufferings and of fame; and the other southern States have exerted themselves in proportion to the force that invaded or insulted them.
Towards the close of the campaign, in 1776, these middle States were called upon and did their duty nobly.They were witnesses to the almost expiring flame of human freedom.It was the close struggle of life and death, the line of invisible division; and on which the unabated fortitude of a Washington prevailed, and saved the spark that has since blazed in the north with unrivalled lustre.
Let me ask, sir, what great exploits have you performed? Through all the variety of changes and opportunities which the war has produced, Iknow no one action of yours that can be styled masterly.You have moved in and out, backward and forward, round and round, as if valor consisted in a military jig.The history and figure of your movements would be truly ridiculous could they be justly delineated.
They resemble the labors of a puppy pursuing his tail; the end is still at the same distance, and all the turnings round must be done over again.
The first appearance of affairs at Ticonderoga wore such an unpromising aspect, that it was necessary, in July, to detach a part of the forces to the support of that quarter, which were otherwise destined or intended to act against you; and this, perhaps, has been the means of postponing your downfall to another campaign.The destruction of one army at a time is work enough.We know, sir, what we are about, what we have to do, and how to do it.
Your progress from the Chesapeake, was marked by no capital stroke of policy or heroism.Your principal aim was to get General Washington between the Delaware and Schuylkill, and between Philadelphia and your army.In that situation, with a river on each of his flanks, which united about five miles below the city, and your army above him, you could have intercepted his reinforcements and supplies, cut off all his communication with the country, and, if necessary, have despatched assistance to open a passage for General Burgoyne.This scheme was too visible to succeed: for had General Washington suffered you to command the open country above him, I think it a very reasonable conjecture that the conquest of Burgoyne would not have taken place, because you could, in that case, have relieved him.It was therefore necessary, while that important victory was in suspense, to trepan you into a situation in which you could only be on the defensive, without the power of affording him assistance.The manoeuvre had its effect, and Burgoyne was conquered.
There has been something unmilitary and passive in you from the time of your passing the Schuylkill and getting possession of Philadelphia, to the close of the campaign.You mistook a trap for a conquest, the probability of which had been made known to Europe, and the edge of your triumph taken off by our own information long before.
